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I want to lay out some scaffolding for this exhibition. No, that’s not quite right: it’s 
more like a parallel track, a spate of scenarios that do a bit of contact improv with the 
show: vignettes that describe a few of the ways in which management practices in 
business, law and finance think the future. That said, the phrase “think the future”, 
here, might be an understatement. Over the past several decades, the ever-expanding 
practices of data analysis have, in the names of efficiency and control, produced, 
enacted and actively experimented with fundamental problems concerning the 
representation of futurity on general populations of citizen/consumers. Under what 
conditions can a depiction of the future hold claim to truth, to accuracy? In what 
senses might a claim about the future – say, a prediction – alter the very future to 
which it speaks, by performing and producing certain kinds of potential while 
preventing others from emerging? In what ways might an individual be justly held 
accountable to a representation of the future used in, say, the penal system? In what 
Bernard Harcourt (2007) calls our “actuarial age”, statistical analyses of risk permeate 
ever more areas of life; and individuals often bear the weight of these predictions. 
Representations of citizenship (be it merely consumer citizenship conceptualized as 
“voting” through spending, or a broader, classical definition including rights and 
responsibilities with respect to law, nation and the commons) increasingly bear the 
marks of data analytics’ surgeries on the future: its pre-emptions and prunings, its 
nudges and steerings.   
Pain Points in the Datascape 
As Karl Palmås (2011) has shown, businesses increasingly base their success on their 
ability to foresee customers’ intentions. Wal-Mart, the world’s largest corporation, is 
able to price out competitors in part due to its ability to effectively use analytics to 
forecast future sales and stock stores accordingly. Their analytics take into account 
even the effects of weather patterns on customer spending; they might, for instance, 
rush order Kellogg’s Strawberry Pop-Tarts® right before a hurricane, since statistics 
show that customers stock up on ready-to-eat food right before a storm. 
Similarly, the American casino chain Harrah’s tracks each of their customers’ 
gambling habits through loyalty cards. From the data they amass, they calculate a 
“pain point” for each customer: “the level of gambling losses that will send the visitor 
home, and possibly make them not come back for a while” (Palmås 2011, p. 348). 
Pain points might be vastly different from person to person; the point is to know 
precisely how much money might successfully be extracted from each individual. 
When gamblers go over their pain points, “luck ambassadors” on the casino floor 
respond in real time, sympathizing with the gamblers’ losses and offering to take them 
out to dinner on the house. In this way, Harrah’s micromanages consumer emotion (p. 
348) to ensure maximum profitability; their doing so hinges on a truth statement about 
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the consumer that governs and predicts their future responses. As Palmås points out, 
such analytical practices increase power differences between large and small 
corporations, since the larger ones are far more likely to reap the rewards of 
sophisticated analytics. They also increase power differences between corporations 
and consumers. By calculating pain points, companies can claim, quite convincingly, 
to know something about their customers that the customers do not know themselves. 
In a political climate in which governments increasingly view tax revenues from 
casinos as substitutes for general tax hikes, slot machine interfaces – which are 
carefully engineered to be addictive (Schüll 2012) – perform an important 
supplemental role in state funding that preys upon, and cultivates, individuals’ 
compulsive need to “gap out” and lose awareness of their everyday problems. While 
there are many forms of future-oriented calculation – such as, say, predicting climate 
impacts on ecosystems – that could be used in service of the commons, pain points 
and other corporate forms of calculation prey upon consumers, cultivating tactical 
advantages over them.  
Towards a Political Economy of Propensity 
When the concept of consumer credit emerged in the late nineteenth century as a 
structuring economic force, techniques used to deem creditworthiness were explicitly 
“character-driven”. Lenders would look into potential borrowers’ eyes, scrutinize 
their dress, their manner, and their wives’ degree of extravagance for signs of 
dependability (McClanahan 2014 p. 34). In the 1970s, quantitative models of credit 
scoring replaced these earlier forms of assessment, in part due to accusations that 
earlier forms of discerning creditworthiness perpetuated racist, classist, ageist and 
sexist lending practices. Credit companies began to algorithmically analyze 
customers’ spending habits and assign credit scores. These scores were meant to be 
perfectly “factual”, unbiased and objective; yet, as McClanahan argues, seemingly 
“objective” scoring methods would often merely launder various forms of 
institutionalized racism and ageism. (As it turns out, people of colour and the elderly 
routinely receive lower credit ratings in the US than their similarly qualified 
white/non-elderly counterparts.) Further, credit card companies would base their 
ratings, in part, on statistical correlations between certain kinds of spending (for 
instance, on marriage counseling, night clubs and massage parlours) and a decreased 
likelihood of paying back loans (McClanahan 2014, p. 39). New customers’ credit 
ratings would go down if they spent money on items and services similar to those 
correlated with other customers’ tendency not to pay. What justifies the use of 
normative statistical measures to govern individuals’ access to credit, and to 
creditworthiness? As lending practices continue to shift – new mortgage lending laws 
in the UK, for instance, necessitate a grueling hours-long personal interview in 
addition to numerical scoring, thus blending qualitative and quantitative techniques 
for granting access to credit (Dunkley 2014) – the question must be raised: is the use 
of statistical correlation to govern individuals’ access to credit any less biased than 
discerning their “character”? 
Whatever the answer to this question might be, such correlative practices have only 
gained footing since the 1970s, as new research bolsters them with a “truth value”. 
Increasingly, “big data” places less emphasis on free will, autonomy, personal 
decision-making and self-expression as it models new ways to link what people 
actually do with what they are likely to become. As MIT scientist Alex Pentland 
enthusiastically puts it,  
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Who you actually are is determined by where you spend time, and which 
things you buy. Big data is increasingly about real behaviour, and by 
analyzing this sort of data, scientists can tell an enormous amount about you. 
They can tell whether you are the sort of person who will pay back loans. 
They can tell you if you're likely to get diabetes…They can do this because 
the sort of person you are is largely determined by your social context, so if I 
can see some of your behaviours, I can infer the rest, just by comparing you to 
the people in your crowd. (Naughton 2014) 
More and more predictive research emphasizes the importance of “imitative rays” of 
behaviour (Tarde 2007, Thrift 2008) coursing through social networks over self-
determination. This statistically aggregated representation of futurity, which comes to 
inform selfhood and regulate individuals’ actual horizons of fiscal, personal and legal 
possibility, has come to be viewed as both justifiable to many researchers because of 
the profound impact of context on an individual, and highly profitable as an area of 
research for corporations and financial institutions – so much so that Nigel Thrift 
(2008) argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a new “political economy of 
propensity”, the outlines of which have yet to be fully written. Within this new 
political economy, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the value of a truth 
statement about the importance of context in determining, say, an individual’s future 
from the machinations of power that would use such a truth statement as a form of 
control. As Deleuze famously argued (1992), the emerging structure of power which 
replaces Foucault’s disciplinary society is the society of control, which functions not 
through institutional boundaries and strict behavioural prohibitions, but by computers 
tracking everything in the background, making “dividual” persons – who are 
controlled by debt – subject to flows of trans-personal information. Given the NSA 
leaks of 2013, Deleuze’s essay seems ever more prescient. 
The Probabilistic, the Possibilistic and the Pre-emptive 
As Evgeny Morozov points out, technology already exists which can track vast 
amounts of personal data in order to predict, for instance, the likelihood of an 
individual committing a crime at a particular time. Given the rapid rate of 
technological change, it is entirely conceivable that in the near future, police forces 
will use algorithms gleaned from personal data to try to pre-empt breaches of the law 
(for instance, by sending more police to potential problem areas). Such logics have a 
long prehistory; as Bernard Harcourt demonstrates, statistical analyses have modeled 
the future in criminal law ever since 1935, when the Illinois State Penitentiary hired 
its first-ever actuary to use the “Burgess Method” for determining the likelihood of an 
individual’s success or failure in parole based on group recidivism rates. Fast-forward 
several decades, and actuarial logic – the employment of statistical, rather than 
clinical, methods to determine risks of criminal behaviour or to administer justice – 
completely “permeates the field of criminal law and its enforcement” (Harcourt 2007, 
p. 2). For some, the use of actuarial logic to, say, more “smartly” target tax audits or 
routine vehicle checks is simply a necessary efficiency in a landscape of limited 
police and legal resources. For Harcourt, on the other hand, actuarial logic distorts the 
very concept of justice itself. It produces biases in the carceral population, and can 
even increase crime in certain instances, as when, for instance, white drivers in the US 
accurately perceive that they are not likely to be targeted in routine checks.   
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While the Burgess Method was based on statistical probabilities, such predictive 
methods fall short in certain contexts. Counter-terrorist tactics and risk assessment for 
nuclear power plants require the analysis of extremely improbable events that – if 
they occur at all – are certainly not likely to be repeated. For such analyses, 
possibilistic thought becomes a more valuable tool than probabilistic thought, which 
focuses on that which is most likely. Possibilistic thought (Clarke 2008) focuses on 
analyzing events that fall outside of probability’s range of focus, and is sometimes 
blended with probabilistic modeling – for instance, in financial institutions’ Value at 
Risk calculations for the derivative market – in an attempt to give a fuller picture of 
the blend of continuity and contingency that characterizes a cultural conception of the 
future. As John Hogan Morris describes them, calculations such as Value at Risk act 
as “a way of governing future instability in the present” (2014).  
Yet the analysis of the extremely improbable is also implicated in a broader set of 
tactical shifts. As Brian Massumi describes it in his work on the U.S. military (2007), 
there has been a shift from preventative to pre-emptive logic since the cold war. 
Whereas, say, a cold war nuclear arms race aims to prevent future attacks by matching 
the enemy’s weapons arsenal, pre-emptive logic does away with such balancing acts. 
Pre-emption, for Massumi, is performative in character; in an era of uncertain enemies 
and improbable, ever-shifting forms of attack, enemies must first be smoked out of 
their holes, actively created through acts of aggression which will invite retaliation 
along the lines that the U.S. can then say their enemies always already would have 
done. The future, as it were, moves into the present: potential enemies are actualized, 
actively created in the present, by performative acts and statements that will be 
retroactively “proven true” through combat. While Massumi focuses on the military 
here, it is worth asking how pre-emptive logic makes its way into all areas of life 
through uncertainty, possibilistic logic, and the broader landscape of both corporate 
and personal drives to render the future knowable. What is the difference, for 
instance, between preventative and pre-emptive measures in medicine? In education? 
In his book on what he calls “technological solutionism” (Silicon Valley’s “there’s an 
app for that” attitude to tackling seemingly all social problems) Evgeny Morozov 
(2013) points to some interesting potential answers. App-based, individualistic 
solutions to everything from nutrition to medicine, exercise and environmentalism 
tend to encourage people to micromanage their own behaviour, but to pre-empt any 
discussions on a broader, systemic level. (For instance, while discussions that might 
question how to hold the food industry accountable for its roles in destroying public 
health might seem difficult, if not impossible to sustain in a solutionist milieu, using 
an app to monitor one’s own eating habits is a readily available option). What is pre-
empted, it seems to me, is an address to the commons, in favour of either atomized, 
individual self-management, or an active production of antagonism through pre-
emptive logic.  
Duration and the Free 
I would like to conclude (however provisionally) by looking backwards, pinpointing a 
particularly salient representation of futurity from the late nineteenth century.  
There is a stunning passage at the end of Henri Bergson’s Time and Free Will (1889). 
As Bergson has meticulously argued throughout the book, duration – the essence of 
time as multilayered, teeming with minute qualitative shifts and heterogeneous, 
rhythmic flows – is completely antithetical to measurement. To count a clock’s 
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pendulum swings and conclude that, say, ten seconds had passed would be to abstract 
time, to falsely quantify what can only be qualitative: the minute, rhythmic shifts in 
the continuous experience of the pendulum’s swing (2005, p. 104). Writing in an era 
of increasing scientificity, in an era which witnessed the early signs of what is now a 
wholesale management and regulation of life and futurity by calculation, Bergson’s 
argument for the illusory nature of quantification had high stakes. For in duration, he 
concludes, we are free. If “our action was pronounced by us to be free, it is because 
the relation of this action to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by a 
law, this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable ever to occur again” (p. 
239).  
For Bergson, the free, unique and singular decision (which is not a human property 
per se, but a property of duration) emerges from all that is heterogeneous and singular 
in experience. The realm of the measurable – which describes a regular, predictable 
world – is mere abstraction. Bergson’s argument is by no means airtight. As Mary 
Ann Doane argues, even this identification of freedom with the contingency of 
duration is ideological; given the increasingly routinized, mechanized conceptions of 
time that apparatuses such as cinema and factory work made possible, “chance and 
the contingent are given the crucial ideological role of representing an outside, of 
suggesting that time is still allied with the free and indeterminable” (Doane 2002, p. 
230). More recently, Ray Brassier (2011) has argued that Bergson, however 
sophisticated his thought may be, falls prey to the “myth of the given” – the belief that 
phenomenal experience can reveal an ontological real. Whether or not this criticism 
really speaks to the heart of Bergson’s argumentation, or whether or not Bergson’s 
intense desire to align free will with qualitative heterogeneity is ultimately more 
ideological than philosophical, is not for me to say. That said, if we view his passage 
as an important moment in the conceptual pre-history of an era of hyper-
quantification, Bergson’s point seems all the more pressing. Can qualitative 
heterogeneity escape the machinations of control-society quantification? Can the kind 
of futurity for which Bergson advocates – an uncoded futurity understood as potential, 
not possibility – stand alone amidst the giants of probability, possibility and pre-
emption? How might both qualitative and quantified representations of the future play 
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